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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MICHAEL JOHNSON, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
I. 
, 
BRIEF 
Case No. 16840 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant~appellant was convicted in the Circuit 
Court for public intoxication in violation of Section 32-1-4 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake Citv, 1965. 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN.LOWER COURT 
The'appellant-Johnson pleaded guilty in the Circuit 
Court to the offense of public intoxication and was fined 
the sum of $15. The Circuit Court denied the appellant-
Johnsol"'s Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Section 32-1-4 
Revieed Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965 as amended, 
was not unconstitutionally vaque. On appeal, the District 
Court upheld both the conviction of the appellant and the 
constitutionality of the City's public intoxication 
ordinance. 
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III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent Salt Lake City seeks to have the 
conviction of the appellant-Johnson uoheld and the ruling of 
the District Court, that Section 32-1-4 Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965 as amended, is constitutional, 
affirmed. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On December 26, 1978,the City fil~d a criminal 
complaint against the appellant-Johnson in the Circuit Court 
for being intoxicated in a public place in violation of 
Section 32-1-4 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 
1965 as amended. (R-4). 
2. On January 9, 1979 the appellant-Johnson filed a 
Motion to Dismiss alleginq that said ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vaquP.. (R-55, 56). 
3. The Circuit Court entered an Order on May 3, 1979 
denyinq the appellant-Johnson's Motion and upheld the. 
constitutionality of the ordinance. (R-62). 
4. On the 14th day of May 1979 counsel for the 
appellant, Mr. Brian Barnard, pleaded the appellant-Johnson 
guilty to the charge of being intoxicated in a public 
place. (R-3, 6). 
5. Thereafter the appellant-Johnson appealed his 
-2-
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conviction to the Third Judicial District Court. After oral 
argument, submission of evidence and hearing on the matter, 
the Court upheld the conviction of the appellant-Johnson and 
the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Court's 
judoment was entered -on the 21st day of December, 1979. (R-
9, 10, 49, 50). 
6. The appellant-Johnson thereafter filed a Notice of 
Appeal. ( R-50). 
7. The appellant has--not raised any disputed issues of 
•, 
fact regarding the constituti~nality--of the City's ordinance 
as applied. The sole issue raised· by the appellant is 
whether the oroinance is constitutional on its face. 
v. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CITY ORDINANCES-ARE PRESUMED TO BE VALID 
AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THF. CONSTITUTION1 
THE BURDEN OF CHALLENGING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A CITY ORDINANCE 
LIES ON THE CHALLENGER 
T~e City ordinance in question, Section 32-1-4 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, provides: 
"Drinking and drunkenness in public places. 
No persons shall drink li~uor in a public 
building, park or stadium or be in an 
intoxicated condition in a public place." 
(See Appendix "A"). 
The defendant has conceded the constitutionality.of the 
first part of this ordinance that "no person shall drink 
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liquor in a public building, park or stadium • • ·" and 
contends only that the term "intoxicated condition" is vague 
and therefore unconstitutional. 
It should first be noted that statutes and ordinances 
are presumed to be constitutional and every reasonable 
presumption will be afforded to render them valid. It is 
the burden of the person challenging the statute to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the law is constitutionally 
defective, Salt Lake City v. Savaqe, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah, 
I 
1~75) Cert. denied 425 U.S. 91~ (1976). 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue as 
follows: 
"It is well settled in this state, as 
elsewhere, that the courts will not declare a 
statute unconstitutional unless it clearly 
and manifestly violates some provision of the 
constitution of the United.States. Every 
presumption must be indulged in favor of the 
constitutionality of an act, and every 
reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its 
validity. (citations omitted) The whole 
burden lies on him who denies the 
constitutionality of a legislative 
enactment." State v. Packer, 297 P. 1013, 
1016 (Utah, 1931). See also, State v. 
Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah, 1952). 
(Emphasis added). 
It should also be noted that Section 32-7-13 Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953) reads verbatim, and is identical, to the 
City's public intoxication ordinance. Therefore the 
decision of this Court will affect not only the validity of 
the subject ordinance, but the state law as well. The 
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state's public intoxication statute cited above was 
collaterally upheld and cited with approval by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Bryan, 395 P.2d 539 (Utah, 1964). 
In the case of State·v. Packard, supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court.held: 
"It is recoqnized that statutes should·not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any 
reasonable basis upon which theymay be 
sustained as falling within the 
constitutional framework [citations omitted], 
and that a statute will not be held void for 
uncertainty if-any sort·of·sensible, 
practical effect may·'be given it." Id. at 
563. •, 
The Supreme Court of the ·United States has repeatedly 
ruled that: 
n• •• - .[T]he Constitution doe~ not require 
impossible standards'1 all that is required 
is that the lanquaqe 'conveys· sufficiently 
definite warninq as to the proscribed conduct 
when measured by com:nion unt:Ierstandinq and · 
practices ••• '" Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 491 (1956). (Emphasis added). 
The United'··States Supreme Court has held that municipal 
ordinances-and<state·statutes will only be·held 
unconstitutional if they "fail to give a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden by the statute." United States ·v. Harris, 347 
U.S. 612~ 617 (1953), cf. Papachristou v.· Jacksonville, 405 
u.s. 156 (1972). 
In discussing the principles of statutory construction, 
the Supreme Court in Harris, supra stated: 
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"The underlyinq principle is that no man 
shall be held criminally responsible for 
conduct which he couln not reasonably 
understand to be proscribed. 
"On the other hand, if the oeneral class of 
offenses to which the statute is directed in 
plainly within its terms, the statute will 
not be struck down as vague, even though 
marqinal cases could be put where doubt might 
arise. [citations omitted]. Id at 617, 618. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held: 
"A statute is vague [only] when it fails to 
inform persons of ordinary intelligence what 
their conduct must be in order for them to be 
guilty of a violation thereof." State v. 
Haiq, 578 P. 2d 837, 839' (Utah, 1978). 
__......_ , 
This latter principle of constitutional law has been 
readily cited by the appellant-Johnson. However, what the 
appellant has failed to do is point out that public 
intoxication ordinances and statutes like those in question 
have been universally upheld by the courts of this country 
against all constitutiona~ challen~es. 
In fact, the appellant has failed to cite any specific 
precedent or direct legal authority whatsoever in support of 
his argument that the City's public intoxication ordinance 
should be declared unconstitutional. The defendant has 
preferred only general principles of law and unsound 
hypotheticals as authority for his argument and has, thus, 
failed to sustain the burden of constitutional challenge. 
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POINT II 
SECTION 32-1-4 REVISED ORDINANCRS OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH 1965, IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
IN ALL REGARDS AND IS NOT UNCONSTITU-
TIONALLY ''AGUE. 
Drunkenness and intoxication in public places are 
unquestionably matters for municipal regulation. Ordinances 
dealinq·with suchMbear a manifest relationship to the public 
peace; health, safety and morals of the community, and the 
cases that so hold are legion. See, Seattle v. Hill, 435 
P.2d 692 (Wash., 1967). 
- , 
Ordinances prohibiting and penalizing public 
intoxication have been universally sustained against 
constitutional .. -challenges such as the one being made by the 
defendant herein. See Quittner v. Thompson, 309 F.Supp. 684 
(1970): Goldstein v. Atlanta, 234 S.E.2d 344 (Georgia, 
' 1977): Ex Parte Boza, 106 P.2d 29 (Cal., 1940): Seattle v. 
Hill, supra: Findlay v. City of Tulsa, 561 P.2d 980 (Okla., 
1977). 
In Findlay, supra, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals rejected the same vagueness argument that the 
appellant herein is raising. The court in reiectinq the 
defendant's argument stated: 
"Only reasonable certainty is required and it 
is elementary that the prohibited act may be 
characterized by a general term without ·· 
definition- if that term has a settled and 
commonly understood meaning which does not 
leave a person of ordinary intelliqence in 
doubt. 
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* * * 
"The condition of being in a state of 
intoxication is a matter of qeneral 
knowledge, the meaning of which is 
sufficientlv 'settled and commonly 
understood' so that definite and sensible 
definition may be made of the words of the 
ordinance in question." Id. at 983, 984. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court in Findlay held that the terms "intoxicated" 
and "drunk" were synonymous and stated the commonly accepted 
meaning of the terms to be: 
"A person is drunk in a.)egal sense wh~n he 
is so far under the influence of liquor that 
his passions are viiibly ~xcited or his 
judgment impaired by the liquor ••• " Id. 
at 688. 
The Findlay Court concluded by holdinq: 
"Therefore it is the opinion of this court 
that since the prohibition aqainst public 
intoxication is well defined and well within 
the province of the state br municipality to 
requlate, the defendant's assertion that the 
ordinance in question is vaque and overbroad 
is found to be without merit." Id. at 984. 
(Emphasis added). 
In Ouittner v. Thompson, supra, the Federal District 
Court of Florida held the term "drunk or intoxicated" in a 
municipal ordinance was not vaque. After citinq the Supreme 
Court standard to he applied in vagueness challenges the 
court held: 
"This court finds, ••• that the phrase 
'drunk or intoxicated' is constitutionallv 
sufficient." Id. at 686. (Emphasis adaed). 
In Ex Parte Boza, 106 P.2d 29 (Cal., 1940) the 
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California Court of Appeals rejected the vaqueness argument 
presented by the defendant and held: 
"The ordinance does provide a punishment for 
those who become intoxicated within the 
, meaninq of that term in .... a public pl.ace or a 
·>;.,place open to public view. We see little 
, merit to petitioner's argument in this 
respect. The constitutionality of the 
ordinance is not subiect to attack upon the 
grounds stated [i.e., vagueness]." Id. at 
32. (Emphasis added). 
The courts have qenerally held that terms "intoxicated" 
and "drunk" to be synonymous. Black's Law·Dictionary (4th 
Ed.) citing a weal th of authorities,. d·ef ines "drunk" as 
follows: 
"A person is 'drunk' when he is so far under 
the influence of liquor that his passions are 
visibly excited or his iudqment impaired, or 
when his brain is so far affected by 
potations of liquor that his intelligence, 
sense-perceptions, judgment, continuity of 
thought or of ideas, speech, and co-
ordination of volition with muscular action 
(or some of these faculties or processes) are 
impaired or not under normal control •••• 
It [drunk] is a synonym of intoxicated." 
(Emphasis added). 
In State v. Painter, 134 S.E.2d 628 (N.C., 1964) the 
North Carolina Supreme Court defined the terms "drunk" and 
"intoxicated" as follows: 
"The word 'drunk' is a synonym for the word 
'intoxicated.' And a person is 'drunk' or 
'intoxicated' when he is so far under the 
influence of intoxicatinq liquor that his 
passions are visibly excited or his judgment 
materially impaired, or when his brain is so 
far affected by potations of intoxicating 
liquor that his intelligence, sense- · 
perceptions, judqment, continuity of thought 
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or of ideas, speech and coordination of 
volition with muscular action, or some of 
these faculties or processes are materially 
impaired. In our opinion, this is the 
definition of 'drunk' or 'intoxicated' 
recoqnized 'in common speech, in ordinary 
experience, and, in iudicial decisions.'" 
The appellant has erroneously argued.that the 
consumption of alcohol no matter how small or from what 
source is sufficient to make a person subject to the 
provisions of the ordinance in question. Such is not the 
case. Individuals are free to consume alcohol and then 
•, 
appear in public place~ withou~ fear of arrest as long as 
they are not intoxicated. It is only when a person has 
consumed alcohol to the point that he or she becomes so 
under the influence of alcohol as to be "intoxicated" or 
"drunk" that a person is. subject to. the provisions Qf __ the 
City's ordinance. 
This same position was adopted by the Court in Quittner 
v. Thompson, supra: 
"It is clear that the pertinent languaqe of 
Section 20-10 of the Dania Municipal Code, 
wh~n measured by common understanding, 
conveys a sufficient and definite warning as 
to what conduct is prohibited by its terms; 
i.e., citizens within the municipality, while 
free to inqest intoxicating liquors, may not 
drink to the point where the influence of the 
liquor deprives them of the possession of 
their normal facilities." Id. at 686. 
The responsibility for making the determination of who 
is intoxicated is rightfully left to a police officer's 
judqment, based upon probable cause. A police officer is as 
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entitled to rely upon his own judgment, experience, and 
knowledge in determining whether a person should be arrested 
for being intoxicated in public, as are members of a jury in 
decidinq such a case in a judicial proceerlinq. 
The appellant has pr·oferred several e){amples as to how 
the City's ordinance could be amended so as to meet 
constitutional criteria. In these examples, the appellant 
allegedly sets forth "·objective criteria" which he feels are 
otherwise lacking in the current City ordinance. Upon 
examination, however, the profe~red guidelines still require 
a po~ice officer to use his own judgment in determining 
whether probable cause exists to make an arrest for public 
intoxication. 
A police· officer must still make a determination of 
whether a ;person is under the influence so as to be "unable 
to exercise care for his safety or the safety of others" or 
whether a person is a "danger to himself or a danqer to 
others". Appellant Brief pp. 14, 15. These proffered 
criteria would still require the same type of judqments 
based upon the arresting officer's experience, knowledge and 
view of the circumstances. 
The appellant's fears of harrassment by a police 
offic~r due to the provisions of the City's public 
intoxication ordinance are without merit. This Court in 
upholding the validity of the City's vagrancy ordinance 
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stated: 
"We are unable to see where any unusual 
authority is given to police officers or to 
prosecuting attorneys by this ordinance. In 
every criminal case a determination must be 
made as to whether a crime has been committed 
and whether the evidence is sufficient to 
obtain a conviction. If those charged with 
the duty of enforcing the law are not doing 
their duty, a qrand jurv can be called. If 
they are overly zealous in making an arrest 
of a defendant, the trial jury will so say, 
and the defendant will then have his civil 
remedies available to him. These matters 
apply alike to this orninance as well as to 
any other crime." Savaqe, supra, 1036-1037. 
The ordinance in question.simply does not allow for 
official misconduct as did the vagrancy statute which was 
struck down by the United States Supreme Court and 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
Papachristou is cited by the appellant for the proposition 
that those who suffer from vague ordinances are the poor, 
idelers, and dissenters of society. 
It is submitted that there has been absolutely no 
allegation supported in fact or otherwise that the City's 
public intoxication ordinance is or has been discriminarily 
- - -- enforced against -the appellant-Johnson or any otherc:person ~ 
on any basis whatsoever. The subject ordinance punishes 
individuals for conduct, not for status, therefore, it is 
- distinguishable from the vagrancy ordinance struck down in 
Papachristou. 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted for the foregoing reasons 
that the appellant has failed to sustain his burden of 
demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the City's public 
intoxication ordinance. The City maintains that its 
ordinance is constitutional and virtually identical to the 
other public intoxication ordinances that have been 
universally upheld against the same constitutional arguments 
made by the appellant in the present case. The conviction 
of the defendant should be up~eld and the District Court's 
decision affirming the constitutionality of the City's 
ordinance should be affirmed. 
DATED this~~~ day of April, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Sec. 32-1-4. Drinking and drunkenness in public 
places. No person shall drink liquor in a public builoinq, 
park or stadium or be in an intoxicated condition in a 
public place. 
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